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Metaphor in Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science
JAKUB MÁCHA
Abstract
This article surveys theories of metaphor in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. In 
particular, it focuses on contemporary semantic, pragmatic and non-cognitivist theories of 
linguistic metaphor and on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory advanced by George Lakoff 
and his school. Special attention is given to the mechanisms that are shared by nearly all 
these approaches, i.e. mechanisms of interaction and mapping between conceptual domains. 
Finally, the article discusses several recent attempts to combine these theories of linguistic 
and conceptual metaphor into a unitary account.
Keywords: analytic philosophy, cognitive science, conceptual metaphor, cross-domain 
mapping, metaphor, non-cognitivism, pragmatics.
1. The scope of this article
Since metaphor has become such a wide-ranging topic, several restrictions must be placed on the scope of this article. This article covers the topic of metaphor from a philosophical perspective 
and only touches briefly upon approaches to metaphor from the fields 
of rhetoric, linguistics, psychology and literary studies. Some attention 
will also be paid to current approaches to metaphor in cognitive science. 
Moreover, this article focuses on thinking about metaphor in analytic 
philosophy (broadly understood) since 1950, leaving out approaches to 
metaphor in continental philosophy. Even within analytic philosophy, 
there are hundreds of theories of metaphor and so this article is able to 
cover only the most influential and important ones, sometimes employing 
crude generalizations.
Philosophical approaches to metaphor are usually called theories 
of metaphor, which may suggest that they are akin to scientific theories. 
However, ‘theory’ must be understood very loosely here (although there 
are exceptions to this: some theories of metaphor are embedded within 
* I wish to thank Marga Reimer for helpful comments. This work has been supported by 
the Czech Science Foundation, project no. GA19-16680S.
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more general theories of linguistic meaning or communication). We can 
reasonably expect a theory of metaphor to fulfil two main functions: (1) 
A theory of metaphor should explain what metaphor is, that is, define 
metaphor. This includes recognizing metaphors in language. (2) The 
central function of a theory of metaphor, however, is to explain how meta-
phors work and what their effects are. This is usually (though not always) 
done by postulating and explaining the notion of metaphorical meaning. 
There are several additional or auxiliary questions, problems, and philo-
sophical issues: what is the nature of metaphorical truth (if there is any)? 
Does metaphor convey cognitive content? Are metaphors paraphrasable 
in literal language? How can the distinction between literal and meta-
phorical (or figurative) language be drawn? Is metaphor a natural kind 
(and thus explainable by a unified theory) or are we dealing with several 
diverse phenomena (each to be explained separately)?
Why do we study metaphor in philosophy? There are two main 
reasons: (1) The topic has traditionally (since Aristotle) been part of 
rhetoric or poetics (today we would say the theory of argumentation and 
literary studies). Among other goals, these disciplines aim to provide a 
useful method for interpreting metaphors. The philosophical issue is also 
how to interpret metaphors in philosophical texts. Or more generally: what 
is the role of metaphors in philosophical texts? There is a long tradition, 
especially within empiricism, of banning metaphors from philosophical 
texts. This attitude started to change under Romanticism. The main 
reason for studying metaphors in the continental tradition is to provide 
tools for interpreting metaphors in philosophical texts. (2) Language 
and especially linguistic meaning became an essential topic in analytic 
philosophy. The second main reason for developing theories of metaphor 
is to complement, question or test general theories of meaning. A theory of 
meaning that ignores metaphor is in some respect incomplete. This article 
focuses primarily on the second point. 
2. Definition and terminological clarifications
A typical way of defining metaphor is by providing some relatively 
uncontroversial examples such as
(1) ‘Richard is a gorilla.’
(2) ‘She was burning with anger.’
(3) ‘Juliet is the sun.’ (W. Shakespeare)
(4) ‘Death is the mother of beauty.’ (W. Stevens)
(5) ‘The hour-glass whispers to the lion’s paw.’ (W. H. Auden)
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It turns out, however, that such examples are anything but uncontro-
versial. For some authors, the first two examples are conventional meta-
phors or even dead metaphors: inactive former metaphors that must be 
excluded from the study. Such authors primarily focus on novel, poetical 
and creative metaphors like (3)–(5). Other authors, in contrast, focus 
primarily on conventional metaphors (and sometimes run into difficulties 
when they attempt to explain rich metaphors). One could say that a theory 
of metaphor can be identified based on the examples it relies on.1 These 
difficulties fuel the suspicion that metaphor is not a unified phenomenon 
(a natural kind) and that we are dealing with a multiplicity of distinct 
phenomena here.
It has been pointed out by many authors that metaphors, or at least 
some of them, are open-ended. That means that interpretation of such 
metaphors has no obvious stopping point and can continue indefinitely. 
Poetic and imaginative metaphors like (4) or (5) above are typically delib-
erately open-ended. On the other hand, there are many metaphors that 
convey a clearly delimited content. They are conventionalized or conver-
sational metaphors like (1) or (2). (3) may be a borderline case. One of 
the most challenging tasks of a theory of metaphor is to account both 
for open-ended and conventionalized metaphors, that is, to allow for 
unlimited and delimited interpretations. Finally, there is the phenomenon 
of dead metaphor, that is, former metaphors that have been convention-
alized to the extent that they are part of our conceptual system. Several 
theories of metaphor aim to explain how a metaphor dies over the course 
of its history (that is, they take a diachronic perspective).
A definition of metaphor is primarily the matter of a particular theory 
of metaphor. Before we go into the details of these theories, reflecting 
on a few pre-theoretical and historical points will be useful. There is, 
of course, no uncontroversial definition of metaphor. Let us begin with 
Aristotle’s definition, which can instruct us about the etymology of the 
term ‘metaphor’. He writes in his Poetics: ‘Metaphor consists in giving the 
thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either 
from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, 
or on grounds of analogy.’ (1457b 6–9) Metaphor is defined in terms of 
transference (ἐπιφορὰ, epiphora). Phora is, in Aristotle’s Physics, a kind 
of change (kinêsis), it is a movement from one place to another – other 
1. See Roger White, The Structure of Metaphor: The Way the Language of Metaphor Works. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1996 for a discussion of this point.
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kinds of kinêsis being a qualitative change (alloiôsis) or a quantitative 
change, that is, either growing or shrinking (auxêsis/phthisis). Several 
authors have pointed out that this definition is itself metaphorical. Phora, 
a term from physics, applied to physical bodies, is moved into the study 
of language and is applied to names (nouns, words). This is something 
universal. As a matter of fact, many, perhaps all, definitions of metaphor 
are metaphorical. Some authors2 have asked whether a non-metaphorical 
definition of metaphor is even possible or desirable. Another observation 
about Aristotle’s definition: the word used metaphorically is transferred 
rather than qualitatively or quantitatively changed. In fact, contemporary 
theories of metaphor often propose various methods for how to change 
the literal meaning into a metaphorical one. This change is usually qual-
itative (in sematic and some pragmatic theories) but can also be quanti-
tative (enrichment in Relevance Theory and other pragmatic theories). 
In contrast, non-cognitivist theories3 insist on Aristotle’s intuition that 
literal meaning does not undergo any change. Finally, Aristotle distin-
guishes four kinds of metaphors. The first three, which concern genera 
and species, would today be classified as metonymies (and it is an open 
question whether metonymy should be classified as a kind of metaphor or 
rather as another figure of speech). Aristotle’s last kind of metaphor defines 
metaphor as in today’s sense. The majority of contemporary theories 
employ, in some sense, the notion of analogy or mapping – between two 
meanings, linguistic systems, semantic fields or domains of experience.
Metaphor is also a linguistic expression of a particular type. A 
definition of metaphor should place metaphor among other non-literal 
or figurative uses of language or among figures of speech. Sometimes 
another figure can be used to explain metaphor (metaphor can be taken 
as a kind of simile, for example); in other cases, metaphor is contrasted 
to another figure.4 Sometimes a theory of metaphor provides a mech-
anism for explaining metaphor alone; in other cases, a theory employs 
2. For instance, Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977 
and Reimer, Marga and Elisabeth Camp, ‘Metaphor.’ In: Lepore, E. and Smith, B. (eds.) 
Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 845–863.
3. Originating in Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean.’ Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1, 
(1978): 31–47.
4. Compare the essential contrast between metaphor and metonymy in Jacobson, and 
Hintikka, Jaakko and Sandu, Gabriel. ‘Metaphor and Other Kinds of Nonliteral 
Meaning.’ In: Hintikka, J. (ed.) Aspects of Metaphor. Dordrecht: Springer, 1994, 
151–187.
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a more general mechanism that is suitable for explaining other kinds of 
non-literal language as well.
2.1. Linguistic and conceptual metaphors
As already noted at the outset, the term ‘metaphor’ is genuinely 
ambiguous. The most crucial ambiguity is the one between linguistic and 
conceptual metaphors. Metaphor has been treated primarily as a linguistic 
phenomenon: metaphors occur in language. We can speak of meta-
phorical words, expressions, sentences or utterances. In their Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, first developed in the 1980s, Lakoff and Johnson locate 
metaphor in thinking, while linguistic metaphors are regarded simply as 
surface manifestations of conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphor is 
a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system. A typical example is 
the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, which is a mapping between entities 
from the domain of journeys and entities from the domain of love:
Travellers are mapped onto lovers.
Vehicles are mapped onto love relationships.
A journey is mapped onto the events in a relationship.
This mapping (a list of ontological correspondences) is a cognitive 
structure of our thinking that may be expressed in surface language in 
various ways, notably in linguistic metaphors:
‘Our relationship has hit a dead-end street.’
‘We’re stuck.’
‘Where is our relationship headed?’
The distinction between linguistic and conceptual metaphors is 
sometimes not evident in recent literature. Some authors use the term 
‘metaphor’ without indicating what kind of metaphor they actually mean. 
For instance, Lakoff5 put forward the contemporary theory of metaphor, 
suggesting that this is the only valid theory of metaphor and that conceptual 
metaphor is the only valid definition of metaphor.
3. Theories of linguistic metaphor
Theories of linguistic metaphor are classified according to the 
domain where they locate the mechanism of metaphorical meaning or 
5. George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor.’ In A. Ortony (ed.) Metaphor 
and Thought. 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 202–251.
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metaphorical effect. These domains are semantics, pragmatics and the 
domain beyond them (sometimes called the perlocutionary realm). The 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics is notoriously a matter 
of dispute. Following Kent Bach6 let us draw the distinction as follows: 
semantics is about what is encoded in what is uttered; it is about encoded 
or conventional meaning. Semantic properties are stable in the sense that 
they are independent of anybody’s act of uttering. Pragmatics is about the 
utterances and about what is said/communicated in the act of uttering. 
Pragmatics is about a speaker’s meaning, which is influenced by a speaker’s 
intentions. Pragmatic properties arise from the act of uttering.
It is also a matter of disagreement where to locate and how to delimit 
pragmatic processes. Literalists have argued that semantics is auton-
omous. The context-dependence of certain expressions is rule-governed 
and semantically constrained and should therefore be handled within 
semantics. Traditional pragmatists like Grice7 argued that pragmatic 
processes (except for disambiguation and reference assignment to index-
icals) usually affect the implicit content of an utterance; they operate at the 
level of implicatures (‘what is implicated’). Accordingly, metaphor would 
be located as a kind of implicature. Contextualists maintain, on the other 
hand, that pragmatic processes are pervasive; they intrude on the level of 
sub-sentential units (words) and on the level of logical form, and affect 
the truth-conditional content of the utterance (‘what is said’, ‘explicature’). 
These processes have various names, such as free/pragmatic enrichment 
or modulation, and contextualists usually explain metaphor by invoking 
these kinds of pragmatic processes.8
Within semantics, there is a challenge of how to cope with context-de-
pendency. More precisely: where is context-dependency to be located and 
how should it be handled? Semantic minimalists argue that the set of 
context-dependent expression should be kept to a minimum (including 
only indexicals, demonstratives and a few other expressions). At any 
rate, metaphors must be located elsewhere, typically beyond semantics 
6. Kent Bach, ‘Minding the Gap’. In C. Bianchi (ed.) The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. 
Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2004, 27–43.
7. Herbert Paul Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation.’ In: P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds.) Syntax 
and Semantics, Volume 3, Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, 1975, 41–58.
8. For instance, Anne Bezuidenhout, ‘Metaphor and What Is Said: A Defense of a Direct 
Expression View of Metaphor.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25, no. 1, (2001): 156–86.
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and pragmatics.9 Other literalists have argued that semantic tools can be 
employed to explain context-dependent expressions like metaphors.10
3.1. Semantic theories
Semantic theories of metaphor claim that metaphors have cognitive 
content that can be captured as a metaphorical meaning, which is a 
kind of non-literal meaning. This metaphorical meaning is produced by 
the interaction of various inputs. It is typically the interaction between 
the literal meanings of the words used literally (primary subject, focus, 
tenor) and the literal meanings of the surrounding words used metaphor-
ically (secondary subject, frame, vehicle) together with the context of the 
utterance. Such a method of interaction is quite general; it is a part of our 
linguistic competence. Note that the term ‘interaction’ is a metaphor used 
to explain metaphors.
Semantic theories go back to I. A. Richards’ Philosophy of Rhetoric 
and Max Black’s seminal paper ‘Metaphor’ from 1955.11 Let us outline 
their theory in more detail, for subsequent semantic and certain aspects 
of pragmatic theories are variations12 and elaborations of this influ-
ential account. In order to cope with the enormous complexity of natural 
languages, they restrict their investigation to subject-predicate sentences 
of the form ‘A is B’. The basic idea is that if such an utterance is intended 
and/or recognized as a metaphor, then the literal meaning of ‘A’ interacts 
with the literal meaning of ‘B’ resulting in a metaphorical meaning of ‘B’ 
which is thereby predicated of ‘A’. Metaphorical interaction is thus a way 
of combining the subject and the predicate that is different from the usual 
(literal) predication. This trait makes this account distinctively semantic. 
Thus, Richards writes, ‘Principle of metaphor: when we use a metaphor 
we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported 
9. Lepore, Ernie and Stone, Matthew, ‘Against Metaphorical Meaning.’ Topoi 29, no. 2, 
(2010): 165–180.
10. Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
11. Ivory A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. London and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1936; Max Black, ‘Metaphor,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55 (1955): 
273–294.
12. Notably Henle’s ‘iconism’ (Paul Henle, ‘Metaphor.’ In: Language, Thought, and Culture. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958, 173–195.) and Beardsley’s ‘metaphorical 
twist’ (Monroe Beardsley, ‘The Metaphorical Twist.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 22, no. 3, (1962): 293–307).
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by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interac-
tion’.13
Black’s main aim is, essentially, to give an explicit characterization 
of these complexes and an explication of how two meanings can interact. 
They do so indirectly through so-called implication-complexes or asso-
ciated implications. An implication-complex is a set of implications predi-
cable to a term. An implication-complex A is a set of implications of the 
form of ‘A implies Ai’ and an implication-complex B is a set of implica-
tions of the form ‘B implies Bi’. These complexes are typically enriched 
by the context of the utterance (by commonplaces, by background and 
encyclopaedic knowledge, by deviant or ad hoc implications induced by 
the author or by the context). (Pragmatic theories have developed this idea 
of contextual enrichment in great detail.) The interaction has a processual 
and reciprocal character:
(a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some 
of the secondary subject’s properties; and (b) invites him to construct 
a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) 
reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject.14
The outcome of the (process of) interaction consists of pairing 
members of these complexes [Ai, Bi]. The meaning Bi is transformed by 
a function fi so that it is predicable of A instead of B. The function fi may 
stand for an ‘(a) identity, (b) extension, typically ad hoc, (c) similarity, (d) 
analogy, or (e) what might be called a metaphorical coupling’, (where, 
as often happens, the original metaphor implicates subordinated meta-
phors).15 In the final step, parallel changes are induced in the secondary 
subject. That is, some of the Ai implications are, conversely, transformed 
and predicated of B even though the surface grammatical form ‘A is B’ does 
not make any commitment that A ought to be predicated of B. The idea 
of pairing two complexes, systems or domains is central also to Lakoff’s 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory as we will see.
Here is an illustration of this method with an example of Thomas 
Hobbes’ metaphor
(6) ‘Consequence is a train’ (of thought).
13. Ivory A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 1936, 94, emphasis added.
14. Max Black, ‘More about Metaphor.’ In: A. Ortony (ed.) Metaphor and Thought. 1st ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 29.
15. Ibid., 31.
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The implication-complexes, which depend on the context of utterance 
or reception, might be:





Implications Implications Pairing Way of pairing
consequence is a 
succession train is a movement
[succession, 
movement] extension
consequence is a link 
connecting thoughts




consequence is a causal 
connection
train connection is 
mechanic [causal, mechanical] extension
consequence is difficult to 
avoid train is difficult to stop
[difficult to avoid, 
difficult to stop] analogy
Additional implications
consequences follow 
logical laws trains follow timetables




The outcome of the interaction might be the following properties pred-
icated of the concept of logical consequence: a kind of causal connection 
connecting thoughts, which is difficult to avoid. This listing is open-ended; 
the hearer is often able to add additional implications. Moreover, there are 
subordinated metaphors: ‘Logical laws are (like) timetables’, ‘Thoughts are 
places in space’. We can now recursively apply the same method to these 
metaphors. Furthermore, train movements can be seen as being more like 
organic processes in human bodies, which are expressed, for example, in 
the biological metaphor ‘the railway network is a nervous system’ or when 
we speak about ‘backbone tracks’.16
The weak spot in this schema is how to determine which implica-
tions from this potentially endless list are included in the metaphorical 
meaning of the original metaphor. We can restate this point as the problem 
of commitment: to which implications is the speaker committed? Either 
16. See Mark Johnson’s (‘Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor.’ In: R. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge 
Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
48–49) discussion of this metaphor in Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis.
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they are committed to (i) all, or (ii) some, or (iii) none of them. The first 
option is wholly implausible. We cannot take Hobbes to be committed 
to the claim that the railway network is a nervous system. There will 
always be implications that were not intended by the speaker as the prop-
ositional content, but that will only be alluded to with lower emphasis. 
The other options seem to be more plausible. We can take Hobbes to be 
committed, for instance, to the implication that consequence is a kind of 
causal connection. However, we can do so only because Hobbes stated this 
implication in the sentence following the original metaphor. The impli-
cation is, thus, asserted in the context of the utterance, but not in the 
utterance itself. The question is how we can distinguish those implications 
that are asserted from those that are merely alluded to or connoted. This 
distinction must be lexically encoded in the metaphor itself or in some 
of its lexical units. But then the metaphorical meaning would be given 
conventionally, which, however, contradicts the definition of metaphor as 
a novel, that is non-conventional, use of language. Those who think that 
metaphorical utterances have a definite cognitive content must also explain 
how to delimit the potentially endless list of pairs of implications. This 
is the main challenge for pragmatic theories and Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory. Non-cognitivists maintain, in contrast, that such a delimitation is 
impossible in principle. In their view, metaphor has no definite cognitive 
content.
The original semantic theories have been further developed using 
more general semantic theories of meaning. Eva Kittay,17 in her ‘perspec-
tival theory’, employed the semantic field theory in order to argue that 
the interacting (or ‘interplaying’ in her terminology) complexes include 
semantic information that goes far beyond the metaphorical sentences. 
Although there are pragmatic clues for recognizing metaphorical utter-
ances, the interplay of semantic fields can be rendered semantically.
Josef Stern18 argues that the context-dependence of metaphor is akin 
to that of indexicals and demonstratives and thus can be explained using 
similar tools. Stern, utilizing Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives, main-
tains that metaphorical sentences contain an implicit operator [Mthat] 
that makes it possible to capture, in a systematic, rule-governed way, 
the intrusion of the context into the interpretation of a metaphorical 
17. Eva Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure. Oxford and New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1987.
18. Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context.
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utterance. Stern’s theory is the most elaborate semantic theory of meta-
phors yet developed. This theory is also exceptional among other theories 
of metaphor, because, unlike the majority of theories, it does not employ 
any interaction or mapping across two domains. Some objections to this 
theory are discussed below.
Semantic theories of metaphor are somewhat out of fashion at 
present. The reason for this may be the fact that the context-dependence 
of metaphor is highly complex. To capture this dependence, very compli-
cated semantic tools must be used. It is no wonder that many literalists 
gave this endeavour up and banned metaphor from semantics. Semantic 
theories of metaphor have also been superseded by pragmatic theories 
that seem to have better resources to cope with metaphor’s context-depen-
dence.
3.2. Pragmatic theories
Speech-act theory and Gricean pragmatics have proved to be a highly 
apt framework for explaining metaphor (along with other non-literal 
linguistic phenomena). Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1975, Searle 1979) 
distinguishes between sentence meaning and speaker (or utterance) 
meaning. Sentence meaning is conventional meaning. Speaker meaning 
is an occasion-meaning; according to Grice, it is determined by the 
speaker’s communicative intention to produce certain effects and by the 
addressee’s recognition of this intention. Speaker meaning is reached by 
sets of inferential procedures; it is thus a form of conversational impli-
cature. Within this theoretical framework, metaphorical utterances are 
cases of speaker meaning rather than sentence meaning. The core of a 
pragmatic theory of metaphor is to describe these inferential procedures. 
In general, they consist of two main stages. The first step is recognizing 
that speaker meaning departs from sentence meaning. This divergence is 
typically recognized as a violation of Grice’s Cooperative Principle; in the 
case of metaphor it is a violation of one of its maxims: ‘Do not say what 
you believe to be false’.19 The second step is the actual inferring of speaker 
meaning. Grice is very brief here, but Searle provided a detailed list of 
principles or procedures by which one can recognize the speaker’s meta-
phorical utterance meaning. These principles provide a rational recon-
struction of shared inference patterns. It is not necessary to state these 
19. Herbert Paul Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation,’ 46. Let us ignore the rare cases of 
metaphors that are literally true.
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principles in detail, because they are fundamentally similar to Black’s 
principles of interaction.
Two points are of importance here. First, pragmatic principles of 
metaphorical interpretation are somewhat vague; they do not sort out 
metaphor from other figures (they apply to implicatures and indirect 
speech in general). This feature is seen by some pragmatists as an 
advantage; by others, however, as a disadvantage.20 Second, there is the 
question of the speaker’s commitment to the inferred speaker meaning. 
Searle is not entirely explicit here, but Grice takes metaphor as a kind 
of conversational implicature where the speaker is not committed to any 
particular inference. Following Anne Bezuidenhout,21 one can employ 
Grice’s cancelability test,22 which was developed to decide whether some 
content is part of ‘what is said’/explicature or merely conversationally 
implied. A particular metaphorical interpretation will always be cancel-
lable in favour of another metaphorical interpretation. Therefore, meta-
phorical interpretations are conversationally implied. The speaker cannot 
be a priori committed to any particular metaphorical meaning.
3.2.1 Contextualism and Relevance Theory
As already noted, contextualism in pragmatics is the view that prag-
matic processes can have an impact on the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance (on ‘what is said’, ‘explicature’). This means that there may be a 
gap between what is semantically encoded and what is directly expressed 
by a sentence. Hence, even in the case of literal utterances, pragmatic 
processes may be at work. One example:
(7) ‘It is quiet here.’
What (7) expresses depends on the context of its utterance. What 
counts as quiet in a recording studio is different from quiet at a busy 
railway station. In the latter case, the encoded concept quiet is loosened, 
resulting in an ad hoc concept quiet*. Another example:
20. By contextualists or for instance Elisabeth Camp, Saying and Seeing-as: The Linguistic 
Uses and Cognitive Effects of Metaphor. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 
2003.
21. Anne Bezuidenhout, ‘Metaphor and What Is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression 
View of Metaphor.’
22. Herbert Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989, 44.
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(8) ‘I overslept and missed the train.’
Suppose that I utter (8) to my boss as an excuse for my being late at 
work. What is expressed by (8) in this context is, however, significantly 
richer than its semantically encoded meaning:
(9) ‘Because I overslept today in the morning, I missed the train that was 
supposed to bring me to work.’
These are examples of pragmatic processes of loosening and 
enrichment (other processes are context-shifting and meaning transfer). 
Enrichment narrows the encoded concept; loosening broadens it. These 
processes can work together. An encoded concept can be loosened in one 
respect and enriched in another. One encoded concept is thus capable of 
expressing indefinitely many ad hoc concepts in proper contexts. We can 
also say that (7) and (8) are instances of loose use of language.
The central claim of the contextualist theory of metaphor is that 
metaphor is an extreme kind of loose usage. The same processes of 
enrichment and loosening are operative in metaphorical utterances. Note 
that these pragmatic processes roughly correspond to the four types of 
metaphorical transfer in Aristotle’s definition.
Let us take Shakespeare’s metaphor again:
(10) ‘Juliet is the sun.’
Its metaphorical interpretation consists of constructing an ad hoc 
concept sun*. This concept is enriched, because from the context of the 
play it is clear that it is a case of the rising sun; the ad hoc concept is also 
loosened, for it is applicable to Juliet or to people in general – to mention 
two out of many pragmatic adjustments. 
Metaphor is a kind of direct expression of ‘what is said’ rather than 
a conventional implicature or inferred speaker meaning, as in Grice or 
Searle respectively. In this respect, metaphor is distinct from figures like 
irony, sarcasm and rhetorical questions and from indirect speech acts 
where something is said and something else is implied. This contrast 
led François Recanati23 to argue that metaphor is a kind of literal use 
of language. He, however, defines literal use of language as its direct 
expression (which allows pragmatic processes as described above). 
Non-literal use of language thus refers to a case when the addressee 
23. François Recanati, ‘Literal/Nonliteral.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25, (2001): 
264–74.
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first constructs the literal meaning and then, due to its oddity, infers a 
secondary/speaker meaning. The major advantage of putting metaphor on 
a par with the literal use of language is this: if literal language is typically 
used for making truth-valued assertions, then metaphorical utterances 
can be used as assertions as well. In particular, if the pragmatic processes 
of enrichment and loosening can result in a definite ad hoc concept in 
the case of literal utterances like (7) and (8), then nothing prevents the 
resulting ad hoc concept in (10) being definite as well. This advantage 
can be turned into a disadvantage: how can the contextualist theory of 
metaphor account for highly poetic, typically open-ended metaphors 
without clearly delimited content, but with the kind of evocative capacity 
seen in Auden’s metaphor above? Bezuidenhout24 responds to this worry 
by pointing out that non-metaphorical interpretations are open-ended 
too. One can always invest more interpretative effort in any utterance. 
One can for instance explore a broader context or bring more background 
knowledge to bear. In the case of a poetic metaphor, this effort will likely 
be rewarded by a richer understanding of the metaphor. Metaphors have 
higher interpretative flexibility.25 Contextualism is, therefore, in a position 
to account for the creative dimension of metaphorical interpretations.
The main line of criticism of this theory (by literalists/semantic mini-
malists) has been to attack the plausibility of contextualism itself. This 
kind of criticism is beyond the scope of this article. One can, however, 
insist on the traditional Gricean orthodoxy that metaphorical interpre-
tations are nevertheless inferred rather than directly expressed, that is, 
one can treat metaphor as a kind of speaker meaning. Elisabeth Camp26 
presents many examples of metaphorical utterances that it is reasonable 
to interpret as implicatures or speaker meaning instead of ‘what is said’. 
‘What is said’ cannot be, according to Camp, radically divergent from 
conventional meaning as contextualists seem to maintain. 
The contextualist theory of metaphor is close to Stern’s27 semantic 
theory of metaphor. They all locate metaphorical content at the level of 
‘what is said’; for these thinkers, metaphorical interpretations are not 
24. Anne Bezuidenhout, ‘Metaphor and What Is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression 
View of Metaphor.’
25. Catherine Wearing, ‘Metaphor and What Is Said.’ Mind and Language 21, no. 3, (2006): 
310–332.
26. Elisabeth Camp, ‘Contextualism, Metaphor, and What Is Said.’ Mind & Language 21, 
no. 3, (2006): 280–309.
27. Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context.
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inferred, but rather direct. Both sides hold that the truth-conditions of 
metaphorical utterances are context-dependent. They disagree, however, 
on whether there are systematic semantic constraints governing this 
context-dependence. What, then, are the arguments for and against these 
positions? Stern28 maintains, contra contextualism, that the contextual 
contribution to the content of an utterance is semantically constrained 
at the level of logical form. Part of the speaker’s linguistic competence is 
to know the rule that maps contextual parameters into the content of the 
metaphor in that context (this rule is called ‘character’ in Kaplan’s theory). 
Stern is ready to acknowledge that there is also pre-semantic and post-se-
mantic context-dependence. The former typically includes the speaker’s 
linguistic intentions and the topic of the discourse, the latter the illocu-
tionary force (the kind of speech-act that it is). Contextualists are guilty, 
according to Stern, of blurring the distinction between pre-semantic and 
semantic context-dependence. 
Contextualists argue against Stern in the following way: his semantic 
theory cannot get rid of pragmatic processes while selecting contextual 
parameters that are mapped onto a metaphorical character.29 Furthermore, 
if metaphors were approached on the model of indexicals and demonstra-
tives, every metaphor (expression type) would need its own metaphorical 
character and not only a single metaphorical operator Mthat (each 
indexical has its own Dthat operator). If this were nevertheless so, there 
would be many ways to place this operator in a sentence. This would, 
however, lead to the need for pervasive disambiguation.30 
Let us now turn to the account of metaphor within Relevance 
Theory,31 which is a general theory of meaning and communication that 
is close to contextualism. Relevance Theory shares with contextualism the 
basic view that there is a significant gap between semantically encoded 
concepts and sentential structures on the one hand and the content that 
is communicated by uttering these encoded concepts and sentences in 
a given situation. Encoded conventional meanings are, almost always, 
28. Josef Stern, ‘Metaphor, Semantics, and Context.’ In: R. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge 
Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
262–279.
29. Anne Bezuidenhout, ‘Metaphor and What Is Said: A Defense of a Direct Expression 
View of Metaphor.’
30. Catherine Wearing, ‘Metaphor and What Is Said.’
31. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1986.
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underdetermined. This gap is bridged by processes of pragmatic modu-
lation, primarily enrichment and loosening. The outcome of a modu-
lation process is an ad hoc (that is occasion-specific) concept that is then 
conveyed. What Relevance Theory adds to this contextualist framework 
is a detailed explanation of the mechanism that governs the pragmatic 
modulation. Clearly, if sentences are used to communicate specific prop-
ositional content, the same modulation must be at work on the speaker’s 
side as on the addressee’s side. If the speaker intends to convey content 
that is not encoded, she must provide her addressee with the relevant 
information needed to infer her intended meaning. Here relevance comes 
into play. Relevance is, in general, the property of any input of a cognitive 
process (in our case, relevance is a property of utterances). The degree 
of relevance depends on two factors: cognitive effects and the processing 
effort needed for achieving these effects. An input is more relevant if it 
leads to higher cognitive effects with less processing effort (for perception, 
memory, inferring). Because human cognition tends to the maximization 
of relevance, the speaker and her addressee can mutually assume optimal 
relevance. This is expressed in the Communicative Principle of Relevance: 
‘Every act of inferential communication conveys a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance’.32 Relevance Theory thus maintains that human 
communication is essentially inferred. Contextualism, in contrast, reserves 
the notion of inference for deriving implicatures from ‘what is said’. The 
inferential process departs from encoded meanings until the addressee’s 
expectations of relevance are satisfied. At this point, after deriving explicit 
content, the process may stop, or it may continue deriving further implica-
tures with lesser degrees of relevance. In fact, both contextual implication 
and implicatures have a particular strength. Sometimes, the speaker 
intends one strong implication, which is asserted; other times, she intends 
to convey an indefinite array of weak implicatures without asserting any 
particular one of them.
Given this universal account of communication and meaning, rele-
vance theorists endorse the contextualists’ claim that metaphorical 
interpretations are arrived at in the same way as other (literal as well as 
non-literal) interpretations. There is nothing distinctive about metaphor. 
Metaphor is at one end of a continuum of cases between literal uses, loose 
uses, perhaps hyperbolical uses and metaphorical uses of language. On 
32. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, ‘A Deflationary Account of Metaphors.’ In: R. Gibbs 
(ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, 179.
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the one hand, metaphorical interpretations can have a clearly delimited 
content. Consider the following conversational metaphor uttered in the 
context of discussing dining habits:
(11) ‘John is a greedy pig.’
By way of loosening and enrichment, the ad hoc concept of pig* 
is created, meaning ‘a person who eats too much’. This interpretation 
satisfies the expectations of relevance in that context. 
On the other hand, Relevance Theory is able to explain more highly 
poetic metaphors. Take for instance the following metaphor by Keats:
(12) ‘Life is but a day; / a fragile dew-drop on its perilous way from a tree’s 
summit.’
One can take the poet to be asserting that life is fragile. This conven-
tional interpretation, however, would not meet the constraints of optimal 
relevance. What is expressed in these lines is somewhat indefinite. There 
is a broader range of weakly implicated claims expressed here (life is 
finite, made of water, moved by external forces and so on). Readers are 
encouraged to entertain some of them, bring in their own life experiences 
and come up with their own implicatures. This multitude of implicatures 
has a higher total relevance than the banal claim that life is fragile. This 
structure of weak implicatures is essential for the poetic effects of certain 
metaphors (and not only metaphors can elicit poetic effects).
Finally, Relevance Theory has the means to explain how a novel 
metaphor becomes routinized and eventually dead, that is, part of our 
literal language. Repeated interpretations of a novel metaphor reduce the 
processing effort of recurrently inferred implicatures, thereby increasing 
their relevance. Some weak implicatures gradually become strong impli-
cations and can eventually become part of the encoded concept.
There have been two main objections raised against contextualism 
in general and Relevance Theory in particular: first, these theories rest 
upon the notion of conventional or encoded meaning which is the starting 
point of pragmatic modulation. This notion has, however, been less 
reflected within Relevance Theory and some (Davidson 1986, for instance) 
have raised doubts about whether convention plays such a central role 
in linguistic communication as has traditionally been assumed. The 
second objection is the worry that the notion of pragmatic modulation 
(enrichment, loosening, meaning transfer and some other processes) 
is rather indeterminate. One could explain any change of meaning by 
invoking some of these processes.
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In 1978, Donald Davidson came up with a radical critique of all 
previous theories of metaphor. He claims: ‘metaphors mean what their 
words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.’33 
This ‘nothing more’ means no secondary/metaphorical meaning and no 
cognitive content, no attached idea. Davidson’s claim seems to be prima 
facie counterintuitive. There are several ways of understanding Davidson’s 
claim. Following Camp,34 we can distinguish its weak reading: metaphor 
is a matter of speaker meaning, not word meaning, from its strong 
meaning: metaphor does not have any meaning and does not convey any 
cognitive content. There might be an issue about the notion of (linguistic) 
meaning. Davidson and other proponents of non-cognitivism maintain 
highly intricate theories of meaning. However, Davidson’s claim does not 
depend on this or that theory of meaning; and that is why Davidson also 
speaks about ‘cognitive content’. Let us focus on the strong reading (for 
the weak reading is not so controversial). Curiously enough, Davidson 
agrees with Black’s and Searle’s descriptions of what metaphor accom-
plishes. He is, however, reluctant to call the outcome of their methods 
and procedures ‘metaphorical meaning’, which is a meaning of the same 
kind as the literal meaning (this view is explicitly endorsed by Searle and 
implicitly by other pragmatists). Davidson’s claim hence comes to this: the 
effects of a metaphor cannot be analysed using the notion of speaker or 
secondary meaning, because such meaning is propositional and conveys 
cognitive content.
To support his view, Davidson offered several arguments. Two of 
them shall be discussed here. The first argument is that the notion of 
metaphorical meaning does no explanatory work: ‘Once we understand a 
metaphor we can […] say what the “metaphorical meaning” is. But simply 
to lodge this meaning in the metaphor is like explaining why a pill put 
you to sleep by saying it has a dormative power.’35 The notion of meta-
phorical meaning will have explanatory power if we are able to determine 
the metaphorical meaning apart from a particular context of use. In other 
words, if there were a shared determinate and rule-governed procedure 
that allows us to take the literal meanings of the words involved and, for 
33. Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ 32.
34. Elisabeth Camp, ‘Metaphor and Varieties of Meaning.’ In: E. Lepore and K. Ludwig 
(eds.) A Companion to Donald Davidson. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 361–378.
35. Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ 33.
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a given context, compute the metaphorical meaning. Semantic and prag-
matic theories rest on the assumption of such a determinate connection. 
Davidson claims, in contrast, that what is distinctive about metaphor is 
precisely the absence of such a rule-governed connection. This connection 
can be described, at best, in causal terms.36 Davidson argued that semantic 
and pragmatic theories’ methods of deriving metaphorical meaning are 
anything but determinate.
This brings us to Davidson’s second argument: ‘there is no limit to 
what a metaphor calls to our attention […] there is no end to what we 
want to mention.’37 As already noted above, non-cognitivists believe that 
the cognitive content of a metaphor cannot be delimited. Thus, it would 
be misleading to call the effect of a metaphor ‘cognitive content’. Many 
authors have objected that at least some metaphors do express a clearly 
delimited cognitive content in a particular context. Non-cognitivists can 
reply that if the cognitive content were delimited, there would have to be 
a rule excluding further content or implications. If this rule were drawing 
upon a linguistic convention, the metaphor in question would be a dead 
one (like the metaphor (11) above). If the rule were quite general (like the 
Communicative Principle of Relevance), non-cognitivists would insist that 
there is no such rule or that such a rule is indeterminate. Such discussions 
usually end up with the resolution that there are two kinds of metaphors: 
conversational ones like (11) that express a clear content and poetic, 
elusive, evocative ones where no clear content is expressed.
Let us turn to Davidson’s positive account of metaphor. The effects 
that metaphorical utterances cause are entirely non-propositional (and 
non-truth-conditional) and therefore not suitable for linguistic communi-
cation. In Austin’s terminology, such effects belong to the perlocutionary 
realm. The point of such an effect is to make us attend to a novel or 
surprising likeness, to promote unexpected and subtle parallels, and, most 
importantly, to make us ‘see one thing as another by making some literal 
statement that inspires or prompts the insight’.38 Davidson thus, with 
reference to Wittgenstein, invokes the notion of seeing-as (more about 
seeing-as later). A metaphor thus makes us invoke or imagine two images, 
36. This aspect of Davidson’s account was elaborated by Rorty who tried to downplay the 
role of literal meaning in metaphor comprehension. Cf. Rorty, Richard. ‘Unfamiliar 
Noises I: Hesse and Davidson on Metaphor.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61, 
Supp., (1987): 283–296.
37. Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ 46, emphasis added.
38. Ibid., 47, emphasis added.
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where one is seen as the other. These images are invoked or prompted 
by the literal meaning (of the involved words). It is important that these 
literal meanings stay active and are not changed by any semantic or prag-
matic method. This is often the case with so-called extended metaphors (or 
rather analogies) like (12) where the reader is invited to imagine her life 
as a dew-drop travelling down from a tree’s summit. In order to imagine 
this natural scenery, we do not need any metaphorical meaning. In this 
respect metaphors are like jokes or even lies, where nobody is tempted to 
postulate any secondary meaning.
Davidson’s non-cognitivism about metaphor does not rest upon his 
theory of meaning and interpretation.39 However, some kinds of literalism, 
and semantic minimalism in particular, draw on Davidson’s account of 
meaning. According to semantic minimalists, semantics with the notion 
of linguistic meaning should be reserved for rule-governed and clearly 
delimited linguistic phenomena. According to this criterion, metaphor 
falls outside semantics, if one follows Davidson’s intuition that there are 
no general rules for creating and interpreting metaphors. Metaphors thus 
do not have any meaning beyond the literal, if ‘meaning’ is understood 
in this minimalist way. In this vein, Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone40 
argue that metaphor cannot be analysed as a kind of speaker meaning if 
the notion of speaker meaning is understood, following Grice and refine-
ments by Lewis and Stalnaker, as an intention to update the conversational 
record.41
4. Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which is sometimes called 
Cognitive Metaphor Theory or Contemporary Metaphor Theory, has been 
further elaborated by George Lakoff and his collaborators ever since Lakoff 
and Johnson’s landmark book Metaphors We Live By.42 The main claim 
39. See Elisabeth Camp, Saying and Seeing-as: The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects 
of Metaphor for a discussion of possible connections between Davidson’s views on 
metaphor and his general theory of meaning.
40. Ernie Lepore, and Stone, Matthew. ‘Against Metaphorical Meaning.’ Topoi 29, no. 2, 
(2010): 165–180. 
41. See Esther Romero and Soria, Belén. ‘Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account of 
Metaphorical Meaning.’ Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2016): 145–172 for a 
critique of Lepore and Stone’s proposal.
42. George Lakoff and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 11980/22003.
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CMT makes is that metaphors are a matter not only of language (i.e., of 
mere words) but of thought. CMT thus distinguishes between conceptual 
metaphors, which operate at the level of thinking, and linguistic meta-
phors (or metaphorical expressions), which occur in language and were 
discussed above. To say that our thinking is inherently metaphorical is 
primarily a claim about the structure of our conceptual system, which is 
structured around conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphor is defined 
as a mapping between two domains, the source domain, which is usually 
concrete, and the target domain, which tends to be more abstract. A 
domain of experience, or conceptual domain, means a category of things 
or, more specifically, a structured and coherent organization of human 
experience. The notion of the domain is close to what is called ‘semantic 
frame’ or ‘lexical field’ in linguistics, ‘mental space’ in cognitive science and 
‘ontology’ in information science. A conceptual metaphor maps entities 
(objects, properties, relations, processes) from the source domain onto the 
target domain.
Let us go back to the example of a conceptual metaphor, LOVE IS 
A JOURNEY. Actually, LOVE IS A JOURNEY is the name of a mapping 
between entities from the domain of journeys and entities from the domain 
of love:
Travellers are mapped onto lovers.
Vehicles are mapped onto love relationships.
A journey is mapped onto the events in a relationship.
Impediments are mapped onto difficulties.
Destinations of the journey are mapped onto the goals of the relationship.
Decisions about direction are mapped onto choices about what to do.
This list of ontological correspondences between our conceptual-
ization of journeys and love is not exhaustive. It is crucial, however, that 
this mapping is a cognitive structure that may be expressed in surface 
language in various ways, for instance, in:
‘Our relationship has hit a dead-end street.’
‘We’re stuck.’
‘Where is our relationship headed?’
‘We may have to go our separate ways.’
‘We are at a crossroads.’
These everyday expressions are not necessarily regarded as linguistic 
metaphors. They are, however, expressions or surface manifestations 
of conceptual metaphors. It is not necessary, for the existence of this 
conceptual metaphor, that the expression ‘Love is a journey’ occurs 
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in an actual utterance. LOVE IS A JOURNEY is a mere name of the 
mapping (and that is why it is capitalized). Moreover, this mapping does 
not occur in any actual utterance as such but is only activated through 
language use, whether metaphorical or literal. CMT nonetheless main-
tains that conceptual metaphor is almost all-pervasive (there are rare 
cases of non-metaphorical concepts that do not belong to any conceptual 
metaphor).
More generally, CMT aims to explain why our conceptual system 
is structured in a certain way, whereas the primary goal of theories of 
linguistic metaphor is to explain what linguistic metaphors mean or 
how metaphorical utterances are processed. Both kinds of theories 
operate with a mapping between two domains. For classical theories, this 
mapping emerges as a result of the interpretation of a linguistic metaphor. 
For CMT, in contrast, the mapping is already there, it is built into our 
conceptual system and it is activated in the processing of literal expres-
sions and linguistic metaphors.
Conceptual domains are not flat sets; rather, they are structured. 
CMT calls the structure of a domain an image-schema. Lakoff proposed an 
image-schematic structure containing elements such as spatial primitives 
(up, down, near, far), containers, boundaries, interiors/exteriors, paths, 
sources/goals of movements, trajectories.43 Image-schemas are like gestalts, 
except they are not static; they are conceptual structures that develop 
from a person’s early childhood. Other authors have suggested many 
refinements of the notion of image-schema. Image-schemas should be 
thought of as abstract mental images, dynamic spatial patterns. Elements 
of image-schemas are building blocks of the most basic conceptual meta-
phors, so-called primitive metaphors (see below).
Conceptual metaphors are not arbitrary. In a conceptual mapping, the 
image-schema structure must be preserved. This is called the Invariance 
Principle. The structure of the source domain cannot be altered, and the 
structure of the target domain cannot be violated. This means, however, 
that the structure of the target domain always remains intact. A metaphor 
always maps the source domain onto the target domain, but not the other 
way around. Metaphorical mappings are thus asymmetrical and partial.
If linguistic metaphors only activate pre-existing conceptual meta-
phors, that is, pre-existing fixed mappings, how can CMT explain the 
novelty and creativity of poetic metaphors? CMT is concerned primarily 
43. George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,’ 245.
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with the structure of our conceptual system, where poetic metaphor is a 
marginal phenomenon. The issue lurking beneath the surface is, however, 
more serious: how does a new conceptual metaphor, a cross-domain 
mapping, emerge? CMT provides several explanations for the mechanism 
of novel and poetic metaphors. The main idea is that existing mappings 
(conceptual metaphors), which are always partial, are either extended 
or combined. This also allows us to characterize different kinds of meta-
phors:44
(i) The first class are non-metaphorical concepts, which are related to our 
experiences with concrete physical objects (‘The balloon went up.’).
(ii) The second class are marginal metaphorical concepts, which are 
conceptual metaphors that are idiosyncratic, unsystematic and isolated 
(‘the foot of a mountain’).45
(iii) The third class are literal conventional metaphors, which are conceptual 
metaphors as described above.
The following species of metaphors go beyond the conventional 
system; they are labelled as ‘non-literal’ or ‘imaginative’.
(iv) The fourth class is made up of extensions of the used part of a literal 
metaphor (‘These facts are the bricks of my theory.’).
(v) The fifth class are instances of the unused part of a literal metaphor (‘His 
theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors.’).
(vi) The sixth class are novel metaphors, which are not based on our conven-
tional conceptual system.
This classification and all the examples are taken from Metaphors We 
Live by. Later, Lakoff came up with the notion of an image metaphor.46
(vii) Image metaphors map one conventional mental image onto another; the 
mapping itself is not conventional, but a ‘one-shot’. These metaphors do 
not involve conceptual domains, but rather structured mental images. 
Their aim is to create or adjust a rich image in the target domain (which 
is usually more abstract) rather than to create an inferential structure. 
Like cross-domain mappings, image mappings must preserve the image-
44. For more details, see George Lakoff and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By and 
Esther Romero and Soria, Belén. ‘Cognitive Metaphor Theory Revisited.’ Journal of 
Literary Semantics 34, no. 1, (2005): 1–20.
45. George Lakoff and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By, 2003, 56.
46. George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor.’
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schema structure. So, for instance, when Kant says that understanding is 
the land of truth, which is an island surrounded by an ocean of illusion, 
we are prompted to perform a mapping of the image of an island amid 
an ocean onto the target domain of our mind’s understanding and create 
an abstract image there. This mechanism of invoking mental images has 
many similarities to the non-cognitivist accounts of metaphor discussed 
above. 
Finally, Lakoff argues that poetic effects can be achieved by combining 
several fixed mappings and activating them simultaneously in one phrase 
or sentence. Lakoff gives as an example Dylan Thomas’ line
(13) ‘Do not go gentle into that good night.’
where ‘go’ employs DEATH IS DEPARTURE, ‘gentle’ employs LIFE IS 
A STRUGGLE and ‘night’ employs A LIFETIME IS A DAY.47 Or let us 
turn back to Keats’ metaphor (12) about life. The first verse activates A 
LIFETIME IS A DAY, which is based on the more basic metaphors LIFE IS 
LIGHT and LIFE IS A CYCLE. The second verse, however, employs LIFE 
IS A JOURNEY, but LIFE IS A CYCLE is explicitly denied there. What is 
important is that these mappings have to be highly conventionalized in 
order to be recognizable in a single line.
4.1. Further development of Conceptual Metaphor theory
Various aspects and details of this basic framework of CMT have 
subsequently been developed further. Let us look at some of these elab-
orations on the basic theory. Many authors have observed that some 
conceptual metaphors are more general and more widespread than others. 
That is, not all conceptual metaphors are at the same level. Some meta-
phors are grounded in our basic experiences, like spatial and temporal 
experiences or basic emotions. Such metaphors, called ‘primary’ or 
‘generic level’ metaphors, tend to be more general (up to a certain extent). 
Here are some examples:
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These primary metaphors can be combined into complex ones, 
like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, which is grounded in the first four primary 
metaphors from the list, but probably not in MORE IS UP. Furthermore, 
conceptual metaphors are very rarely isolated mappings; rather, they 
belong to hierarchically organized systems. There are several principles of 
organization for such hierarchies: for instance, according to some aspects 
of the source domain, aspects of the target domain or aspects of gener-
ic-level metaphorical concepts like EVENT or FORCE. One example of 
such a hierarchy:48
EVENTS ARE MOVEMENTS
⤷ ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS 
(‘What is the next step?’)
	 ⤷ LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS 
(‘a long-run project’)
	 	 ⤷ LOVE IS A JOURNEY
If we go down through this hierarchy, the generic level concept 
EVENT is being more and more precisely specified: EVENT → ACTION 
→ LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY → LOVE RELATIONSHIP. 
Hence, if conceptual metaphors are structures of our conceptual system, 
hierarchies of conceptual metaphors can be conceived as higher-level 
structures of this system. 
At the end of the 1990s, several authors, including Lakoff, started to 
employ the results of neuroscience and cognitive science and use them 
as the basis for CMT. More specifically, Lakoff drew on Neural Theory of 
Language, which is a variant of Computational Theory of Mind, in order 
to develop his Neural Theory of Metaphor.49 The basic tenet of Neural 
Theory of Language is that the meaning of concrete concepts is embodied 
in certain neuronal groups, so-called nodes. These nodes are sometimes 
connected by permanent bindings, sometimes by instantaneous links. 
48. See Zoltán Kövecses, ‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory.’ In: E. Semino and Z. Demjén 
(eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Metaphor and Language. Oxon and New York: 
Routledge, 2017, 13–27 for a good overview of several hierarchies, see also Ruiz de 
Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José and Pérez Hernández, Lorena. ‘The Contemporary 
Theory of Metaphor: Myths, Developments and Challenges.’ Metaphor and Symbol 26, 
no. 3, (2011): 161–185 for a different approach.
49. George Lakoff, ‘The Neural Theory of Metaphor.’ In: R. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge 
Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
17–38.
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Reasoning is, then, the consecutive activation of certain nodes. Nodes 
that are often activated together or synchronically are more likely to be 
connected by a permanent link.50
Within this cog-sci framework, conceptual domains can be grounded 
in concrete nodes or circuits. Sometimes, the source and target domains 
are active simultaneously. This can be explained by the fact that the circuits 
in which these domains are embodied are connected by a permanent link. 
These are cases of primary metaphors which are either innate or learned 
at an early age through our first experiences. In cases of more complex 
conceptual metaphors, which are most likely learned and partly culturally 
conditioned, the activation of the target domain can be slightly postponed. 
The source domain circuit is activated first, then, in combination with the 
context, this in turn activates the target domain circuit and the mapping 
circuit. This should, however, not be seen as an algorithmic or step-by-step 
process.
The main advantage of employing the methods of cognitive science 
within CMT is that they provide an empirical basis independent of 
linguistic evidence, on which CMT had formerly relied. Neural Theory of 
Metaphor provides explanations for why we use certain conceptual meta-
phors and how they are grounded in our primitive experiences with the 
world. Finally, this theory redefines the meaning of the main claim of CMT, 
that is, that metaphor is a matter of thought. Conceptual metaphor is a 
matter of thinking processes that are physically embodied in our brains. 
Conceptual Blending Theory, sometimes called Conceptual 
Integration, is another important offspring of CMT, although it draws on 
other sources as well. Like CMT, Blending Theory is based on the notions 
of domain and mapping. Blending theorists prefer to call a domain ‘mental 
space’. Instead of two domains, Blending Theory works with multiple 
mental spaces: the generic space, (at least two) input spaces or simply 
inputs and the blended space. Whereas CMT is primarily concerned with 
the structure of our conceptual system, the primary objective of Blending 
Theory is to explain the emergence of instantaneous meaning. Conceptual 
metaphor is a mapping between two domains. In Blending Theory, the 
generic space and the inputs are projected into a newly emergent entity, 
which is called the blend. More specifically: first, a mapping is established 
between the generic space and each of the input spaces, which contains 
50. This is so-called Hebb’s principle: neurons that fire together wire together.
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what the inputs have in common.51 Then there emerges a cross-space 
mapping between the input spaces. Finally, a blended space is developed. 
There is a three-step process for achieving this: composition (of the 
elements from the inputs), completion (bringing additional structure to 
the blend) and elaboration (running the blend, modifying it imagina-
tively). In addition, there is a backward projection: that is, the elements of 
the blend are projected back onto their counterparts in the input spaces.52 
These steps cannot be conceived as events in an actual process unfolding 
over time.
Although Blending Theory has different goals and priorities to CMT, 
conceptual metaphors can be described as one kind of blend (namely, 
single-scope blends). Here is an example:53 CMT takes the ARGUMENT 
IS WAR metaphor as a mapping between the source domain of WAR 
and the target domain of ARGUMENTATION. There are several corre-
spondences between the elements from these domains. Some of these 
correspondences are activated in various linguistic expressions like ‘He 
destroyed my argument’. Blending Theory, in contrast, begins with the 
generic space of OPPOSING, with two inputs, WAR, ARGUMENT. These 
spaces are composed in the emerging blend ARGUMENT UNDERSTOOD 
AS WAR. Then, there is a backward projection of this blend into the input 
spaces (for instance, military combat can be seen as argumentation). 
This backward projection is explicitly denied in CMT. Lakoff,54 being 
more sceptical about interpreting conceptual metaphors within Blending 
Theory, presents examples of conceptual metaphors that cannot be taken 
as blends. For instance, the sentence ‘The temperature went up’ expresses 
the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP. There is no emergent structure 
that would combine the domains of TEMPERATURE and VERTICAL 
ELEVATION. Blending Theory can, on the other hand, explain meaning 
emergence, where one cannot find two clearly distinguished domains. In 
fact, simultaneous mappings, like those involved in the poetic metaphors 
(4), (5), (12) and (13), are can be better explained by Blending Theory.
51. Fauconnier, Gilles and Turner, Mark. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the 
Mind’s Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books, 2002, 41.
52. Compare Black’s method of interaction discussed above where a similar backward 
projection concludes the process too.
53. Taken from Dancygier, Barbara. ‘Figurativeness, Conceptual Metaphor, and Blending.’ 
In: E. Semino and Z. Demjén (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Metaphor and Language. 
Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2017: 32.
54. George Lakoff, ‘The Neural Theory of Metaphor.’
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4.2. Debates and criticisms
CMT has been an extremely successful theory, and it has been 
discussed, developed and applied substantially more than any other theory 
of metaphor. This, however, does not mean that CMT is widely accepted 
without any critical issues. In what follows, we look at some criticisms 
that are relevant from a philosophical point of view.55
One line of criticism has been levelled against the very notion of 
conceptual metaphor. Some authors have doubted the very existence 
of conceptual metaphors, whereas others have questioned the explan-
atory value of the conceptual metaphor construct.56 The main argument 
raised against CMT is an accusation of circular reasoning: the most 
important evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphors is the exis-
tence of (mostly dead) linguistic metaphors or the existence of linguistic 
polysemy in general. Conceptual metaphors, however, have to explain 
the very existence of linguistic metaphor and the metaphorical structure 
of our conceptual system. So, for example, we talk about love in terms 
of journeys because we think of love in terms of journeys; however, we 
know that we think of love in terms of journeys because we talk about 
love in terms of journeys. Proponents of CMT dismiss these objections 
by pointing out that the evidence of the existence of conceptual meta-
phors is not current linguistic practice but rather the structure of our 
conceptual system, which is (to an extent) invariant across cultures and 
languages. Furthermore, Neural Theory of Metaphor presents additional 
non-linguistic evidence. This line of argument, however, brings us to the 
ongoing debate about the level at which conceptual metaphors exist. Do 
conceptual metaphors reside primarily at the level of cultural models or 
do they express some aspect of contemporary language (polysemy, for 
instance), or is neural processing the most fundamental level? This debate 
also concerns the most fundamental level of evidence for the existence of 
conceptual metaphors.57 
Another particular criticism has been targeted at the vagueness of 
the notion of domains. Advocates of CMT usually dismiss this criticism 
55. See Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José and Pérez Hernández, Lorena. ‘The 
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: Myths, Developments and Challenges’ and 
Raymond Gibbs, ‘Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory.’ Discourse Processes 48, 
(2011): 529–562 for detailed overviews.
56. Matthew McGlone, ‘What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?’ 
Language and Communication 27, (2007): 109–126.
57. See Raymond Gibbs, ‘Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory,’ 552 for a discussion.
Provided for Personal License use. Not for reproduction, distribution, or commercial use.
© 2019 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. All Rights Reserved.
Provided for Personal License use. Not for reproduction, distribution, or commercial use.
© 2019 Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. All Rights Reserved.
Metaphor in Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science 2275
2019
Vol. 75
Fasc. 4 RPF 2019
Vol. 75
Fasc. 4 RPF
by insisting on the definition of a domain as a coherent organization of 
human experience.58 However, this criticism cannot be so simply refuted. 
As we have seen above, domains have unused parts that can be acti-
vated, or they can be extended in non-literal metaphors. Among attempts 
to implement CMT in computational models, Barnden points out that 
domain boundaries and domain divisions are based on decisions made 
by metaphor theorists. These decisions about the structure of domains 
impact on reasoning about particular metaphors, which, in effect, must 
be considered theory-relative. It is thus a (useful in isolated cases) fiction 
that domains do real work in metaphor.59 These results call into question 
neural approaches within CMT which are based on the presupposition 
that conceptual domains are real structures embodied in neural nodes 
and circuits.
The problem of delimiting conceptual domains leads to the problem 
of putting constraints on metaphorical mappings. Lakoff’s Invariance 
Principle (the preservation of the image-schema of the source and the 
target domain) is one such constraint. Several amendments and refine-
ments of the principle have been proposed.60 Matthew McGlone61 argues 
that CMT is committed to the claim that all aspects of the source domain 
that preserve the Invariance Principle are mapped onto the target domain. 
This suggestion is supported by some of Lakoff’s formulations, for instance: 
each mapping is ‘a fixed pattern of ontological correspondences […]. As 
such, each mapping defines an open-ended class of potential correspon-
dences across inference patterns. When activated, a mapping may apply 
to a novel source domain’.62 There is a possible tension between ‘fixed’ and 
‘open-ended’. Raymond Gibbs63 argues that primary metaphors impose 
crucial constraints on conceptual mappings. The debate is, however, still 
ongoing because these constraints cannot explain why only a limited 
part of a potentially open-ended domain gets activated in everyday 
language. Some authors have suggested that methods from other theories 
58. Zoltán Kövecses, ‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory,’ 24.
59. Barnden, John. ‘Metaphor and Artificial Intelligence: Why They Matter to Each Other.’ 
In: R. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 331.
60. See Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José and Pérez Hernández, Lorena. ‘The 
Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: Myths, Developments and Challenges,’ 180–182.
61. Matthew McGlone, ‘What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?’, 114.
62. George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,’ 210.
63. Raymond Gibbs, ‘Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory,’ 535–537. 
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of metaphor might be employed here.64 As we have seen above, this is a 
problem that also affects semantic and pragmatic theories of metaphor.
Another critique concerns the originality of CMT. The idea that 
metaphor is a matter of thinking (or even brain processes) rather than 
language was endorsed by philosophers such as Herder and Nietzsche. 
The observation that our language is clustered along certain analogies 
has been made by many philosophers and rhetoricians since Cicero and 
Quintilian. These authors used various labels for the phenomenon of 
conceptual metaphor: allegory (Quintilian), radical metaphor (Müller), 
ex-metaphor (Jespersen), symbolic representation/analogy (Kant), back-
ground metaphor (Blumenberg), analogic frame and, of course, dead 
metaphor.65 Olaf Jäkel66 provides an extensive list of possible predecessors 
of CMT, ranging from Locke and Vico to Arendt and Blumenberg. Lakoff 
countered such a critique by insisting that ‘one can find quotes here and 
there’ that ‘are usually so vague you can’t tell’.67 Johnson claims that the 
theories of Searle and Davidson are ‘badly mistaken’68 because they ignore 
the empirical research on conceptual metaphor and for that reason are not 
able to explain this phenomenon. This is, however, a terminological misun-
derstanding. Searle’s and Davidson’s theories focus on the phenomenon 
of linguistic metaphor and its processing. CMT is primarily concerned 
with the fixed structure of our conceptual system, which is not Searle’s 
or Davidson’s concern at all. Where CMT explains novel and imaginative 
metaphors (points (iv)–(vii) above), it uses a mechanism and explanation 
not that different from those used by Searle and Davidson.69
64. Raymond Gibbs, ‘Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory’ and Deirdre Wilson, 
‘Parallels and Differences in the Treatment of Metaphor in Relevance Theory and 
Cognitive Linguistics.’ UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 22, (2011): 41–55.
65. See Mehlenbacher, Ashley Rose and Harris, Randy Allen. ‘A Figurative Mind: Gertrude 
Buck’s The Metaphor as a Nexus in Cognitive Metaphor Theory.’ Rhetorica: A Journal 
of the History of Rhetoric 35, no. 1, (2017): 75–109 for a detailed analysis and also for a 
critique of the label ‘conceptual metaphor’.
66. Olaf Jäkel, Kant, Blumenberg, Weinrich: Some Forgotten Contributions to the 
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor.’ In: R. Gibbs and G. J. Steen (eds.) Metaphor in Cognitive 
Linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997, 9–27. 
67. Pires de Oliveira, Roberta. ‘Language and Ideology. An Interview with George Lakoff.’ 
In: R. Dirven, B. Hawkins and E. Sandikcioglu (eds.) Language and Ideology, Vol. 1: 
Theoretical Cognitive Approaches. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001, 23–47.
68. Johnson, Mark. ‘Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor,’ 47.
69. For details, see Jakub Mácha, ‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Classical Theory: 
Affinities Rather than Divergences.’ In: P. Stalmaszczyk (ed.) From Philosophy of 
Fiction to Cognitive Poetics. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016, 93–115.
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CMT has been criticized for its bold claims about the nature of 
reality, the essence of cognition and the structure of our mind. Let us, 
then, look at the philosophical implications of CMT as voiced by its propo-
nents. Lakoff and Johnson call for a ‘revis[ion of] central assumptions in 
the Western philosophical tradition’70 or claim that ‘analytic philosophy 
in general [is] fundamentally mistaken’.71 In particular, they argue against 
the ‘myths’ of objectivism and literalism. They regard objectivism as the 
view that the world is made up of objects which have properties inde-
pendent of any people who experience them and we gain our knowledge 
by experiencing such objects and properties.72 Under literalism (not to be 
confused with literalism as discussed above) Johnson73 includes classical 
theories of (literal) meaning that do not pay attention to the phenomenon 
of conceptual metaphor. Following this definition, Searle, Rorty and 
Davidson are literalists. Now, denying literalism implies denying objec-
tivism and the correspondence theory of truth because standard theories 
of meaning are rooted in (the myth of) objectivism. Several authors 
have cast doubt on whether an empirical theory like CMT can have such 
far-reaching philosophical consequences.
This brings us to CMT’s implications for a general theory of meaning. 
Lakoff and Johnson are opposed to the common praxis of ‘extending or 
patching up some existing theory of meaning’74 in order to account for 
the phenomenon of metaphor. For that reason, they consider virtually 
all theories of meaning within analytic philosophy to be mistaken. On 
the other hand, they endorse some of the key elements of Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy: family resemblances, rejections of the picture and the 
building-block theory of meaning, taking the meaning as relative to the 
context.75 Later, after the cognitive turn, the basis of meaning is its embod-
iment in organic neural structures. This is, however, a presupposition of 
Neural Theory of Metaphor rather than its implication. If language and 
meaning are considered to be embodied, then CMT has an important 
implication: there are no separate nodes, circuits or brain centres respon-
sible for specific tasks. Our mind is holistic rather than modular, as main-
stream cognitive science (including Relevance Theory) has it.
70. George Lakoff and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By, 2003, ix–x. 
71. Pires de Oliveira, Roberta. ‘Language and Ideology. An Interview with George Lakoff,’ 24.
72. George Lakoff and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By, 2003, 147.
73. Johnson, Mark. ‘Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor.’
74. George Lakoff and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By, 2003, ix.
75. Ibid., 182.
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5. Hybrid theories and other accounts
It is not surprising that each theory of metaphor explains some 
kinds of metaphors better than other kinds. Some theories focus more 
on poetic metaphors, others on conversational metaphors and still others 
on conventionalized metaphors. This brings us back to the question of 
whether metaphor is a unified phenomenon (that is, a natural kind) to be 
explained by a single theory, or whether we are dealing with a multitude 
of diverse phenomena only accidentally labelled as ‘metaphor’. Prima 
facie, a unified theory (of metaphor, of figurative language, of meaning in 
general) would be preferable. No such theory has yet been found. On the 
other hand, this may lead to inappropriate overgeneralizations that would 
disregard the intricate complexities of the phenomena under scrutiny. 
These issues have led to the rise of hybrid theories of metaphor. Some 
of them pick out certain aspects from other theories but aim at a unified 
account; others are more bifurcated, highlighting differences among 
various kinds of metaphor.
Adopting the latter option, William Lycan76 proposes combining 
Searle’s pragmatic theory with Davidson’s non-cognitivist/causal theory. 
Lycan argues that many metaphorical utterances can be explained as cases 
of clearly delimited speaker meaning, while other metaphorical utter-
ances are more open-ended and thus transcend the category of speaker 
meaning. Lycan further maintains that Searle’s theory is the most appro-
priate theory for explaining the former cases, and Davidson’s theory for 
the latter cases. Although these two classes cannot be accounted for by a 
unified theory, they occupy two ends of a scale. Lycan, in fact, proposes 
that one should try to interpret a metaphor within Searle’s framework by 
finding speaker meaning, and then, if this turns out not to be possible, 
to look for non-propositional effects (both approaches can be employed 
simultaneously). Furthermore, Lycan defends his Pragmatic-Causal 
Theory against many possible objections and highlights the advantages 
of his theory over Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Relevance Theory. 
Roger White’s77 refined and subtle theory is in many respects similar to 
Lycan’s.
Some authors, notably Robyn Carston,78 have recently suggested 
76. William Lycan, ‘An Irenic Idea about Metaphor.’ Philosophy 88, no. 1, (2013): 5–32.
77. Roger White, The Structure of Metaphor: The Way the Language of Metaphor Works.
78. Robin Carston, ‘Metaphor: Ad hoc Concepts, Literal Meaning and Mental Images.’ 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110, (2010): 295–321; Robin Carston, ‘Relevance 
Theory and Metaphor.’ In: E. Semino and Z. Demjén (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of 
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combining Relevance Theory with Davidson’s non-cognitivism. The 
Relevance Theory orthodoxy states that open-ended poetic metaphors 
are analysed in terms of (possibly open-ended) arrays of weak impli-
catures. These implicatures are nevertheless propositional in nature. 
Carston argues that there are cases of imaginative metaphor where literal 
meanings remain active longer (that is, they are not immediately prag-
matically modulated) in order to evoke images. The reader is then invited 
to elaborate on a comparison between such images and the topic of the 
metaphor. In other words, one thing (the topic) is seen as something else 
(an evoked image). Let us illustrate this by reference to Keats’ extended 
metaphor (12), now in a broader context:
Stop and consider! life is but a day;
A fragile dew-drop on its perilous way
From a tree’s summit; a poor Indian’s sleep
While his boat hastens to the monstrous steep
Of Montmorenci.
The reader is invited to see life, the topic of the metaphor, through the 
images of a day, of a dew-drop gliding from a tree and of an Indian sleeping 
in a boat that is approaching the Montmorenci Falls. The Relevance Theory 
approach would be to adjust the literal meanings of the words used meta-
phorically into the ad hoc concepts day*, dew-drop*, tree*, Indian*, boat* 
and Montmorenci*, which would evoke an array of weak implicatures. 
Although this is not impossible in principle, Carston proposes an alter-
native way of processing such metaphors: the literal meaning is lingering 
in the background while the metaphors are being processed. An instant 
transformation of these literal meanings would, in fact, prevent these 
images from being evoked. This is an idea that comes from Davidson, who 
claimed that literal meanings must remain active in their metaphorical 
setting and not be transformed into metaphorical meanings. Carston 
highlights the imaginative aspects of Davidson’s theory and sidelines the 
causal aspects. There are also, according to Carston, two kinds of metaphor 
processing: (a) pragmatically adjusting literal meanings and (b) evoking 
mental images and elaborating on a comparison between these images 
and the topic of the metaphor. In the former method, literal meanings 
are adjusted in order to capture the topic; in the latter method, the topic 
is adjusted in order to correspond to the literal meaning. Following the 
Communicative Principle of Relevance, the reader may prefer one route 
over the other. There are, however, kinds of metaphors where one method 
Metaphor and Language. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2017, 42–55.
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is clearly preferable to the other. Carston thus tends to side with those 
who think that there are two types of metaphors: that is, metaphor is not 
a unified phenomenon.
Relevance Theory has been combined with other theories as well. 
It is the only major account of metaphor that is not based on mappings 
between two conceptual domains. The idea is to take such a mapping 
from some other theory and find a role for it within Relevance Theory. 
This idea is also implicit in Carston’s proposal above, except it works with 
a mapping between two images rather than conceptual domains. Esther 
Romero and Belén Soria79 propose combining Relevance Theory with a 
mapping approach, primarily drawing on Black’s Interaction Theory, but 
consistent with CMT as well.80 They take up the problem of emergent prop-
erties: if metaphorical interpretations are arrived at by a kind of loosening 
of the encoded literal meaning, how, then, can new properties emerge in 
metaphorical concepts that were not part of the original meanings and 
that originate in encyclopaedic knowledge? Relevance Theory explains the 
emergence of encyclopaedic properties by appealing to a loosening of loos-
ening. Romero and Soria argue, contra Carston, that we can nevertheless 
employ the mechanism of an ad hoc concept construction; the input of 
such a pragmatic process is not an isolated atomic concept (like day, 
dew-drop or tree), but rather larger conceptual structures (represented 
by phrases or by an extended text). The complexes, similar to Black’s 
implication-complexes, are already enriched and consist of sometimes 
divergent ad hoc implications. The inputs may be either atomic concepts 
or a complex structure that within CMT is called a ‘source domain’. These 
inputs are then processed in the same way, following the Communicative 
Principle of Relevance. Once we start with an already enriched domain, 
other ad hoc concepts can emerge based on this domain and not neces-
sarily originating in the lexical meanings of any lexical units used in the 
metaphor. This approach allows for a unitary, homogeneous explanation 
of all metaphors. Metaphor, for Romero and Soria,81 is a kind of language 
use with certain essential characteristics found in all instances of it.
Another hybrid theory comes from Markus Tendahl.82 His basic 
79. Esther Romero and Soria, Belén. ‘Relevance Theory and Metaphor.’ Linguagem em 
(Dis)curso 14, no. 3, (2014): 489–509.
80. Esther Romero and Soria, Belén. ‘Cognitive Metaphor Theory Revisited.’ Journal of 
Literary Semantics 34, no. 1, (2005): 1–20.
81. Esther Romero and Soria, Belén. ‘Relevance Theory and Metaphor.’ Linguagem em 
(Dis)curso: 506.
82. Markus Tendahl, A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor: Relevance Theory and Cognitive 
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approach is to provide a theory of metaphor processing that draws on 
Relevance Theory and Blending Theory and whose inputs are structured 
along the lines of conceptual domains (image-schemas) and conceptual 
metaphors (and other cognitive structures). Tendahl calls such structures 
conceptual regions. They consist of context-invariant parts (lexical content) 
and context-dependent parts known as ‘free slots’, which are connectors 
to external knowledge structures. There are two kinds of free slots, 
entrenched or ad hoc. Entrenched slots are typically filled with conceptual 
metaphors. The content of ad hoc slots is generated entirely from the 
context of the utterance. The emergent enriched structure is similar to 
mental spaces as defined in Blending Theory. Only parts of the input struc-
tures are activated and transferred into a mental space. This activation 
is guided by the expectation of relevance, that is, by the Communicative 
Principle of Relevance. Only those parts of the input structures are acti-
vated that contribute to the overall relevance of the utterance. In cases 
of activation of conceptual metaphors, the Invariance Principle must be 
preserved, that is, the image-schema of the source domain must not be 
violated. Tendahl83 argues that his hybrid theory is able to cope with cate-
gory-crossing metaphors which are problematic within Relevance Theory 
because of emergent properties that are not part of the lexical content of 
the involved concepts. One example:
(14) ‘Ruud is a tree.’
Ruud is the name of a person, but no apparent properties of trees can 
be attributed to people. These lexical concepts, however, have free slots 
that can be filled with the conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS. 
This metaphor maps certain attributes of plants onto specific attributes of 
people. Some of these attributes, those that contribute to the relevance of 
the utterance, are activated and transferred into the ad hoc concept tree*. 
This concept consists of (some) properties of people, not of trees. On the one 
hand, Tendahl’s hybrid theory is able to explain how some properties can 
emerge in the course of metaphor processing by considering conceptual 
metaphor mappings; on the other hand, it has a mechanism available 
for determining which elements of the source domain are mapped onto 
the target domain and activated in the resulting ad hoc concept. Deirdre 
Linguistics. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009.
83. Markus Tendahl, A Hybrid Theory of Metaphor: Relevance Theory and Cognitive 
Linguistics, 218. 
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Wilson84 has advanced the similar idea that Relevance Theory can offer 
a mechanism for restricting conceptual metaphor mappings, that is, for 
deciding which elements are activated in a concrete utterance.
In conclusion, hybrid accounts of metaphor are often able to utilize 
the particular advantages of theories they combine while avoiding 
their particular disadvantages. The price to pay for this manoeuvre is a 
disruption of the unity of the concept of metaphor itself.
5.1. Seeing-as
Many authors have noticed a link between metaphor and visual perception. 
Aristotle says that for the right use of metaphor one needs to have ‘an eye 
for resemblances’ or, in Janko’s more verbatim translation, ‘to observe what 
is like [something else]’ (ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν, homoion theorein estin).85 Black 
and Davidson conclude that metaphor is to be likened to seeing-as. Davidson 
furthermore mentions Wittgenstein’s ‘duck-rabbit’ and maintains that ‘seeing 
as is not seeing that’.86 Some pragmatic approaches, such as Carston’s,87 also 
explicitly invoke the notion of seeing-as. In the metaphor ‘A is B’ the subject A 
is thus seen as the predicate B. This ‘seeing-as’ is (again) a metaphorical expla-
nation of metaphor. The seeing-as in a metaphor is supposed to be akin or 
somehow analogous to the seeing-as in visual perception. In the terminology of 
CMT, we are dealing here with the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING 
IS SEEING and its subordinate metaphor UNDERSTANDING METAPHORS 
IS SEEING-AS. Let us look at several ways in which this idea has been 
developed.
Some authors88 have taken up the suggestion that metaphor is like 
Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, an ambiguous picture which has multiple aspects 
that can dawn and switch between each other. This idea has usually been 
developed into hybrid theories combining tenets of pragmatic and non-cog-
nitivist approaches. The basic story is that in the metaphor ‘A is B’ the frame 
concept B activates some aspect of the topic concept A. This topic concept A 
84. Deirdre Wilson, ‘Parallels and Differences in the Treatment of Metaphor in Relevance 
Theory and Cognitive Linguistics.’ 
85. Poetics, 1459a.
86. Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ 45.
87. Robin Carston, ‘Relevance Theory and Metaphor,’ 51.
88. Marcus Hester, The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor: An Analysis in the Light of Wittgenstein’s 
Claim that Meaning is Use. Paris: Mouton, 1967; Roger White, The Structure of Metaphor: 
The Way the Language of Metaphor Works; Jakub Mácha, ‘Metaphor: Perceiving an Internal 
Relation.’ Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 17, (2009): 235–237.
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is now organized as if it were the frame B.89 This is what one can extract and 
interpolate from Wittgenstein’s characterization of aspect seeing.
There are more developed and fine-grained approaches that go far beyond 
this basic story. The most prominent one is arguably Camp’s theory.90 Here is 
the gist of the theory: by uttering the metaphor ‘a is F’ the speaker intends her 
addressee to think of a under the aspect of F (or to frame a in terms of F). This 
means that the addressee takes the most prominent features in the framing 
characterization of F, identifies relevant matching features of the subject a 
and raises these a-features to prominence. This prominence is determined by 
the context of the utterance. The characterization of a is thus reconfigured or 
restructured in such a way that those a-features that match the prominent 
F-features are highlighted. This process is not only an invitation to cultivate 
a perspective (as non-cognitivist theories maintain), but also a precondition 
for identifying propositional content which is asserted with illocutionary 
force (that is, which is part of speaker meaning). The speaker presents the 
subject a framed by the perspective F and intends to convey some proposi-
tional content that is accessible (only) from this perspective. The addressee 
is invited to cultivate this perspective, in order to access the propositional 
content intended by the speaker. In other words, the content is not accessible 
unless the addressee is engaged in framing the subject in the way intended by 
the speaker.91 Cultivation of a perspective is a typical non-propositional effect 
of metaphor. This effect can, however, be a way to access, or a precondition for 
accessing, some propositional content.
This account of perspective allows talk of ‘seeing-as’ or ‘perspective’ to be 
taken literally, that is, as a spatio-temporal point of view. The resulting meta-
phorical thinking will, then, be rather pictorial. Perspective can be taken in 
a more abstract way than just selecting certain features. The resulting meta-
phorical thinking will then be more abstract.
The addressee may continue thinking of a under the perspective F. She 
may include less prominent features in the framing characterization of F and 
try to match them with some features of a. A metaphor interpretation can 
hence lead to specific propositional content and, at the same time, be rich and 
open-ended.
Camp’s theory combines and refines the central tenets of Black’s interac-
tionism and Searle’s pragmatics theory while espousing the key intuitions that 
89. Jakub Mácha, ‘Metaphor: Perceiving an Internal Relation.’
90. See Elisabeth Camp, Saying and Seeing-as: The Linguistic Uses and Cognitive Effects of 
Metaphor and her subsequent articles.
91. Elisabeth Camp, ‘Why Metaphors Make Good Insults: Perspectives, Presupposition, 
and Pragmatics.’ Philosophical Studies 174, no. 1, (2015): 47–64.
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fuel non-cognitivist approaches, primarily their insistence on the pictorial and 
imaginative dimension of understanding metaphor. The notion of perspective 
has been elaborated as a frame, which is a notion that goes back to Charles 
Fillmore’s frame semantics. The same source led to the development of the 
notion of a domain within CMT.
Gergő Somodi92 has put forward a perlocutionary account of metaphor, 
which is in many respects similar to Camp’s theory, but which is closer to 
non-cognitivism (albeit different from Davidson’s/Rorty’s causal account). 
Somodi maintains that, after all, the ultimate aim of a metaphorical utterance 
may be, in some cases, to elicit the framing effect.
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